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We explored the influence of implicit motives and activity inhibition (AI) on subjectively
experienced affect in response to the presentation of six different facial expressions
of emotion (FEEs; anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) and neutral
faces from the NimStim set of facial expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). Implicit
motives and AI were assessed using a Picture Story Exercise (PSE) (Schultheiss et al.,
2009b). Ratings of subjectively experienced affect (arousal and valence) were assessed
using Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM) (Bradley and Lang, 1994) in a sample of 84
participants. We found that people with either a strong implicit power or achievement
motive experienced stronger arousal, while people with a strong affiliation motive
experienced less arousal and less pleasurable affect across emotions. Additionally, we
obtained significant power motive × AI interactions for arousal ratings in response to
FEEs and neutral faces. Participants with a strong power motive and weak AI experienced
stronger arousal after the presentation of neutral faces but no additional increase in arousal
after the presentation of FEEs. Participants with a strong power motive and strong AI
(inhibited power motive) did not feel aroused by neutral faces. However, their arousal
increased in response to all FEEs with the exception of happy faces, for which their
subjective arousal decreased. These differentiated reaction patterns of individuals with
an inhibited power motive suggest that they engage in a more socially adaptive manner
of responding to different FEEs. Our findings extend established links between implicit
motives and affective processes found at the procedural level to declarative reactions to
FEEs. Implications are discussed with respect to dual-process models of motivation and
research in motive congruence.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates two questions. Firstly, it examines whether
implicit motives (power, affiliation, and achievement motives)
predict subjective affective reactions to other people’s facial
expressions of emotion (FEEs). Secondly, it explores whether the
trait of activity inhibition (AI) moderates a potential relationship
between the implicit power motive and affective responses.
Implicit motives are unconscious motivational dispositions
(needs) that energize the attainment of motive-specific incentives,
or the avoidance of motive-specific disincentives, by charging
them with affect (Schultheiss, 2008). Currently, the “Big Three”
implicit motives are the focus of most research (Schultheiss
and Brunstein, 2010). For people with a strong need for power
(nPower), having impact on others represents an incentive, while
losing impact or being in a submissive position represents a
disincentive. For people with a strong need for affiliation (nAf-
filiation), being in a close harmonious relationship represents
an incentive, while separation or the loss of a relationship rep-
resents a disincentive. And finally, for people with a strong
need for achievement (nAchievement) the autonomous mas-
tery of challenging tasks represents an incentive, while failure
in reaching a standard of excellence on one’s own represents
a disincentive, respectively (Atkinson, 1957; Schultheiss, 2008).
Implicit motives are assessed with the Picture Story Exercise (PSE;
McClelland et al., 1989), a derivative of Morgan’s and Murray’s
(1935) Thematic Apperception Test, and do not correlate with
the corresponding explicit questionnaire measures of motivation
(McClelland et al., 1989; Spangler, 1992). Implicit motives are
assumed to be part of brain circuits that have evolved earlier in
evolution (Rolls, 1999; Schultheiss, 2013) and to respond prefer-
entially to nonverbal stimuli, like FEEs, which are perceived and
experienced directly, as compared to verbal stimuli, like spoken or
written words, which represent symbolized knowledge that does
not directly relate to subjective perception and experience. This
distinction is in accordance with two-systems models of infor-
mation processing (Schultheiss, 2001), which assume that verbal-
symbolic stimuli trigger more conscious information processing,
while experiential stimuli trigger more unconscious information
processing, along with according modes of behavior.
For implicit motives, preferential processing of nonverbal-
experiential stimuli has been demonstrated for various emotional
and affective phenomena. Using a dot probe task (Mogg and
Bradley, 1999), Schultheiss and Hale (2007) found that atten-
tional orienting toward or away from FEEs depends on both
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perceivers’ motive strength (nPower and nAffiliation) and the
incentive salience of FEEs for a given motive. Wang et al. (2011)
corroborated this finding by showing that the salience of FEEs
depends on participants’ motive strength (nPower), as assessed
withmotive-dependent differences in event-related potentials in a
Stroop task with differently colored faces. Further evidence for the
role of implicit motives in affective processes comes from studies
in which procedural learning (e.g., of visuomotor sequences) was
reinforced by FEEs, again depending on their incentive salience
for a motive, as well as by social success and failure, e.g., in a
dominance contest (reviewed in Schultheiss and Schiepe-Tiska,
2013). Finally, implicit motives have also been shown to deter-
mine subjective ratings of affect, such as emotional well-being
in everyday life (Brunstein, 2010). Motive effects on emotional
processes have been most consistently documented for nPower,
while effects for nAffiliation and nAchievement remain to be clar-
ified [for an overview see Stanton et al. (2010)]. Taken together,
the studies reported above indicate that nonverbal stimuli, espe-
cially FEEs, convey information about the incentive salience of
situational stimuli, which in turn determines a wide spectrum of
affective reactions that depend on a person’s implicit motives.
A frequent moderator of motive effects on behavior is AI,
which is measured as the frequency of negations in spo-
ken/written text (cf. Langens, 2010). As an example, the sentence
“He did not study his opponent’s tactics before the boxing match
and therefore was not able to beat him,” written about the PSE
image “boxer,” would be scored twice for AI. The validity of the
AI construct has been demonstrated by its predictive power for
a wide spectrum of outcome measures—from biological reac-
tions like systolic blood pressure in response to a performance
test (Fontana et al., 1987) to the overall economic performance
or perceived greatness of political leaders (Spangler and House,
1991). In early conceptions, AI was assumed to represent a lin-
guistic marker of an individual’s mere ability to inhibit emotional
impulses and behavior (e.g., McClelland and Boyatzis, 1982).
In more modern conceptions, AI is understood as a propen-
sity to engage emotion-processing functions of the right hemi-
sphere, which are supposed to facilitate the flexible adjustment
of behavior to challenging circumstances in social interactions
(Schultheiss et al., 2009a). The right hemisphere also plays a key
role in the encoding and decoding of nonverbal signals of emotion
such as FEEs (e.g., Adolphs, 2002), which might be the mediating
process for AI influences on various social outcomes. Thus, a per-
son who is confronted with an ambiguous FEE that could either
be interpreted as a neutral or hostile FEE, for instance, should
better be able to thoroughly process the meaning of the stim-
ulus and hence to react more adequately in terms of subjective
affective reactions as well as actual behavior if he or she is high in
AI, but not if he or she is low on this variable (Schultheiss et al.,
2009a). Next to these AI main effects, AI influences can often be
found in interaction with implicit motives. Jointly high levels of
AI and nPower, the so called inhibited power motive, appear to be
particularly predictive of physiology and behavior. The inhibited
power motive has been linked to a more nonverbally expressive
and persuasive communication style (Schultheiss and Brunstein,
2002), to more social and economic success (presumably because
individuals with an inhibited power motive know how to read
other people’s nonverbal signals; cf. McClelland and Boyatzis,
1982), and to higher levels of sympathetic arousal (McClelland
et al., 1980). Together, these findings indicate that high levels of
AI let people high in nPower express their need for influence
in a socially adaptive manner of affective-emotional behaviors
and responses and thus to make these people navigate the social
environment more successfully.
To sum up, previous research suggests that implicit motives,
as well as the inhibited power motive, influence both the expres-
sion of one’s own affect and subjective reactions to someone else’s
FEEs, along with associated physiological arousal. So far, however,
motive-dependent responses to FEEs have only been reported for
procedural measures of affective responses to emotion-eliciting
stimuli, but not for declarative measures, like subjective affect
ratings. Understanding if and when implicit motives and AI are
reflected in subjective affective responses may help make people
aware of their implicit motives and use this awareness for the
selection and pursuit of motive-congruent goals.
In our study, we start to fill this gap by exploring effects
of implicit motives in general and the inhibited power motive
in particular on a declarative measure of affect in response to
FEEs. We presented participants with six FEEs from the NimStim
set (Tottenham et al., 2009), recorded their subjectively expe-
rienced arousal and valence in reaction to the presentation of
these FEEs using the Self-AssessmentManikin (SAM; Bradley and
Lang, 1994), and related individual differences in these ratings to
participants’ implicit motives and AI.
As previous research has shown, FEEs are an especially salient
class of (dis-)incentives for nPower (Stanton et al., 2010). For
arousal ratings, we therefore assumed that nPower is associated
with pronounced affect ratings across all emotions. For valence
ratings, however, we assumed no straightforward main effect,
as nPower might amplify valence ratings in reaction to differ-
ent FEEs into different directions—e.g., more positive reactions
to FEEs that represent incentives and more negative reactions to
FEEs that represent disincentives for that motive. As effects of
nAffiliation and nAchievement remain to be clarified in the con-
text of affective and emotional processes, we investigated their
effects on affect ratings in an explorative way. Additionally, we
explored the role of AI as a potential moderator of relationships
between nPower and affect ratings.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-five students enrolled at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, were tested (no Psychology majors) in a study approved
by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Michigan.
Nine participants with missing PSE data (due to technical prob-
lems), and two participants who did not follow the instruc-
tions (revealed by a lack of variance in their affect ratings)
were excluded from analyses. The remaining 84 participants (59
women) were 19.65 years old on average (SD = 1.60).
DESIGN
Participants’ implicit motives were measured between sub-
jects. FEEs (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise,
and neutral expressions), face gender (female, male), and face
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race (African-American, Caucasian) were varied within subjects.
Arousal and valence ratings in response to the FEEs were the
dependent variables.
PROCEDURE
Participants first gave their informed consent. Then their implicit
motives were assessed. After working on unrelated tasks (a short
Implicit Association Task, two questionnaires, and a gender rating
task), participants completed the affect ratings. Finally, partic-
ipants provided demographic information, were debriefed and
paid $30. Stimuli, instructions, and materials were presented via
PCs. Responses were recorded with standard keyboards and mice.
MEASURES
Implicit motives and activity inhibition
Implicit motives were assessed with the PSE, using the stimuli and
instructions described in Schultheiss et al. (2009b). Participants
wrote imaginative stories about eight pictures that were subse-
quently coded for motivational imagery (nPower, nAffiliation,
and nAchievement) by an expert coder using Winter’s (1994)
manual. The scorer had previously exceeded the 85% inter-
rater agreement criterion on calibration materials as a measure
for scoring reliability and was blind to the research hypotheses.
AI was determined per word-count software as the frequency
of the negation “not” in its written-out and contracted vari-
ants in participants’ PSE stories (see Schultheiss et al., 2009a).
On average, participants wrote 919 (SD = 275) words, contain-
ing 4.74 (SD = 2.88) power, 5.64 (SD = 3.11) affiliation, 7.04
(SD = 2.91) achievement images, and 8.33 (SD = 6.33) AI scores
summed across stories. Scores for test-retest reliability of motive
scores derived from PSE stories are reported in Schultheiss and
Pang (2007) and fall in the range from rtt = 0.71 (1 day inter-
val) to rtt = 0.25 (10 years interval). Implicit motive and AI scores
correlated with protocol length (all p < 0.072) and differed from
normal distributions. Therefore, we followed the recommenda-
tions by Smith et al. (1992) and used square root transformations
[sqr (1 + raw score)] to establish normality, corrected the trans-
formed scores for protocol length using regression, and converted
the residuals to z-scores. In so doing, we ensured that implicit
motives scores follow a normal distribution and are not just a
by-product of mere word count (people who write longer stories
in the PSE would otherwise have higher implicit motives scores
partly as a function of their higher verbal fluency). These z-scores
were used for all analyses.
Affect ratings
We assessed participants’ affective reactions to FEEs using the
SAM scales (Bradley and Lang, 1994) for subjectively experienced
arousal and valence. Participants were instructed to indicate, how
the pictures (of facial expressions) make them feel using the two
rating scales. For the arousal ratings, participants had to indicate
whether a picture makes them feel anxious, calm, or some-
where in between. For the valence ratings, participants had to
indicate whether a picture makes them feel sad, happy, or some-
where in between. Both scales ranged from 1 (no arousal/most
sad) to 5 (highest arousal/most happy). All 96 stimuli were pre-
sented twice and participants rated their reaction to them first in
terms of arousal and then in terms of valence, without time lim-
its for responding. Internal consistencies for the different FEEs
categories ranged from α = 0.92 to α = 0.95 (median α = 0.94)
for arousal ratings and from α = 0.77 to α = 0.93 (median α =
0.91) for valence ratings. Stimuli were randomly presented one
at a time, with the instruction and the rating scale below the
stimulus.
We used FEEs and neutral expressions from the NimStim set
(Tottenham et al., 2009) as stimuli and chose pictures from the
three persons with the highest prototypicality ratings of each of
the following stimulus face categories: African-American women
(#12, 13, 14), Caucasian women (#7, 9, 10), African-American
men (#22, 27, 36), and Caucasian men (#40, 41, 43). From each
of these twelve stimulus persons we used six FEEs (anger, disgust,
fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) and one neutral expres-
sion. Open-mouth versions were selected throughout, except for
sad and neutral expressions. Faces were cropped so that each was
visible from cheekbone to cheekbone and hairline to chin. Picture
portions below the jawline were blackened and faces’ heights were
resized to 19.5 cm (width varied due to posers’ physiognomy).
To control for general response tendencies to pictorial cues, we
additionally included a set of twelve neutral stimuli.
ANALYSES
To maximize test power and to accommodate the continuous
motive variables, we ran (repeated-measures) regression analyses
in SYSTAT 13. Only the within-subject factor “FEE” was consid-
ered for analyses, but not the factors gender and race, as they
were merely introduced to obtain a representative set of stimulus
images.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics of affect ratings in response to facial expres-
sions as well as their intercorrelations with implicit motive and
AI scores are summarized in Table 1. Significant differences for
arousal and valence ratings between FEEs emerged [all F(5, 415) >
197.15; all p < 0.001]. Post-hoc t-tests with p set at 0.05 revealed
an anger > disgust = fear > surprise = sadness > happiness
relation for arousal ratings and an anger < disgust = fear =
sadness < surprise < happiness relation for valence ratings. For
neutral expressions, arousal ratings differed from the neutral off-
set, defined as the scale minimum [t(83) = 12.78, p < 0.001] and
valence ratings tended to be lower than the neutral midpoint of
the scale [t(83) = −1.74, p = 0.085].
Averaged across FEEs, arousal and valence ratings corre-
lated negatively (r = −0.64, p < 0.001), with greater variance
in arousal than valence ratings [F(83, 83) = 2.35, p < 0.001].
nAchievement and nAffiliation correlated positively (r = 0.35,
p = 0.001).
MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AFFECT RATINGS
Motive influences on affect ratings in response to neutral faces
To rule out associations between motivational predictors and
affect ratings that are caused simply by viewing a human face,
we first explored whether implicit motives and AI were asso-
ciated with arousal and valence ratings in response to neutral
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Table 1 | Means, SDs, and raw correlations of implicit motives (z-scores), activity inhibition (z-score) and affect ratings in response to the
presentation of six facial expressions of emotion and neutral faces (arousal ratings below diagonal; valence ratings above diagonal).
Variable Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.99 2.13 2.27 4.15 2.27 2.89 2.93
(SD) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.69) (0.67) (0.62) (0.70) (0.51) (0.56) (0.36)
1. nAchievement 0.00 (1.00) — 0.35** 0.05 −0.00 −0.16 −0.17 −0.25* −0.10 −0.17 −0.07 −0.01
2. nAffiliation 0.00 (1.00) 0.35** — 0.09 0.01 −0.20# −0.19# −0.20# 0.08 −0.14 −0.11 −0.16
3. nPower 0.00 (1.00) 0.05 0.09 — −0.16 −0.15 −0.18# −0.10 0.12 −0.11 −0.16 −0.00
4. AI 0.00 (1.00) −0.00 0.01 −0.16 — −0.14 −0.11 −0.21# 0.09 −0.05 −0.04 0.06
5. Anger 3.84 (0.71) 0.17 0.03 0.27* 0.10 −0.56*** −0.59*** −0.54*** 0.16 −0.42*** −0.29** −0.09
6. Disgust 3.55 (0.80) 0.20# −0.09 0.26* 0.11 −0.45*** −0.60*** −0.56*** 0.05 −0.36*** −0.38*** −0.11
7. Fear 3.48 (0.74) 0.21# 0.01 0.20# 0.15 −0.45*** −0.55*** −0.58*** 0.03 −0.32** −0.35** −0.05
8. Happiness 1.67 (0.71) 0.21# 0.03 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.10 −0.15 −0.45*** 0.09 −0.36*** 0.02
9. Sadness 2.76 (0.79) 0.23* −0.08 0.22* 0.03 −0.40*** −0.46*** −0.46*** −0.11 −0.32** −0.38*** −0.14
10. Surprise 2.84 (0.73) 0.27* 0.04 0.15 0.15 −0.41*** −0.47*** −0.55*** −0.10 −0.32** −0.53*** −0.18
11. Neutral 2.02 (0.74) 0.12 −0.02 0.15 −0.03 −0.19# −0.24* −0.23* −0.24* −0.05 −0.29** −0.20#
#p < 0.100; *p < 0.050; **p < 0.010; ***p < 0.001.
faces. For this purpose, we ran two separate regression analyses
for each affect dimension (a total of four regressions). Regression
analyses included either the individual motive scores and AI
simultaneously, or alternatively nPower, AI, and their interac-
tion term as predictors. In light of the variance overlap between
arousal and valence ratings, we controlled for valence ratings in
response to the neutral faces when testing for arousal ratings and
vice versa in all regression analyses.
An analysis with arousal ratings as dependent variable
revealed a significant nPower × AI interaction effect (see
Table 2) 1. This interaction effect differed only marginally when
we repeated the analysis using an AI median-split predictor
(B = −0.275, SE = 0.160, t = −1.72, p = 0.090). Post-hoc anal-
yses using an AI median split showed that nPower was associ-
ated with higher arousal ratings of neutral expressions in low-
AI individuals (t = 2.23, p = 0.031, semipartial r = 0.34), but
not in high-AI individuals (t = −0.16, p = 0.874, semipartial
r = −0.03).
Neither the effects of individual implicit motives or AI on
affect measures, nor the nPower×AI interaction effect on valence
ratings became significant (all t < |1.44|, all p > 0.154) 2. (For
regression analyses on valence, ratings of three outliers with stu-
dentized residuals up to 3.82 had to be removed from analysis.)
Taken together, these findings suggest that AI and nPower jointly
bias ratings on non-emotional faces to a substantial degree. All
further analyses on the influence of implicit motives and AI
should therefore control for affect ratings in response to neutral
faces.
1The nPower × AI interaction effect remained significant when we did not
control for valence ratings of neutral faces (B = −0.177, SE = 0.087, t =
−2.04, p = 0.044).
2None of these effects became significant when we did not control for arousal
ratings in the prediction of valence ratings or vice versa (all t < |1.37|, all p >
0.174).
Table 2 | Test statistics of the regression analysis predicting arousal
ratings in response to neutral faces from the interaction of nPower
and AI.
Variable B SE t p
Constant 3.188 0.650 4.90 <0.001
Valence (Neutral) −0.406 0.220 −1.85 0.069
nPower 0.118 0.079 1.50 0.138
AI −0.014 0.080 −0.18 0.859
nPower × AI −0.178 0.086 −2.08 0.041
R2 0.11
F(4,79) 2.46#
Valence (Neutral), Valence rating in response to neutral faces; nPower, implicit
power motive; AI, activity inhibition.
#p = 0.052.
Motive influences on affect ratings in response to facial
expressions of emotion
Due to the results for neutral faces and also due to the vari-
ance overlap between valence and arousal ratings as well as
between implicit motives, in subsequent analyses we simultane-
ously included (a) all implicit motive and AI scores (or alter-
natively nPower, AI, and their interaction term), (b) same-scale
ratings for neutral expressions, and (c) other-scale ratings of FEEs
as predictors in the regression analyses predicting affect ratings in
response to FEE (e.g., analyses on arousal ratings included average
arousal ratings for neutral expressions and average valence rat-
ings for FEEs as predictors).We thus ensured that implicit motive
and AI (interaction) effects on arousal or valence ratings were
not influenced by variance overlap between motive scores, over-
all response bias (ratings on neutral expressions), and the high
variance overlap between arousal and valence ratings. Post-hoc
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analyses accordingly controlled for these factors as well. As for
the analyses on neutral faces, this resulted again in a total of
four (repeated-measures) regression analyses—two for each affect
dimension.
A first regression analysis on arousal ratings with individ-
ual motive scores and AI as predictors indicated that nPower
was marginally associated with higher arousal ratings (semipar-
tial r = 0.18), nAffiliation was significantly associated with lower
arousal ratings (semipartial r = −0.22), and nAchievement was
significantly associated with higher arousal ratings (semipartial
r = 0.21) of FEEs (see Table 3 for test statistics)3.
A second regression analysis on valence ratings with individual
motive scores and AI as predictors indicated that nAffiliation was
marginally associated with lower valence ratings (semipartial r =
−0.19), while effects of nPower and nAchievement did not reach
significance (see Table 4 for test statistics)4. Motive main effects
on both affect dimensions are illustrated in Figure 1.
A third repeated-measures regression analysis on arousal rat-
ings revealed a significant nPower × AI × emotion interaction
effect [F(5, 390) = 3.46, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.036] 5. This interac-
tion effect differed only marginally when we repeated the anal-
ysis using an AI median-split predictor [F(5, 390) = 4.74, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.048]. Follow-up regressions resulted in a significant
nPower × emotion interaction for high-AI (above median) indi-
viduals [F(5, 190) = 4.77, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.083], but not for low-
AI (below median) individuals [F(5, 190) = 0.94, p = 0.454, η2 =
0.022]. After plotting and inspecting the interaction separately for
all six FEEs (see Figure 2), we ran a post-hoc comparison of regres-
sion slopes of the FEE of happiness against the average regression
slope of all other FEEs (i.e., comparing positively and negatively
valenced FEEs). A follow-up repeated-measures regression with
high-AI individuals revealed a significant nPower × emotion
interaction [F(1, 38) = 8.20, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.140]. Contrasting
these FEEs best summarizes the original interaction effect. In
3When we did not control for valence ratings of FEEs, the overall regression
analysis remained significant [F(5, 78) = 15.35; p = 0.001, R2adjusted = 0.46].
The main effects of nAchievement (B = 0.134, SE = 0.053, t = 2.50, p =
0.014, semipartial r = 0.25) and nPower (B = 0.099, SE = 0.051, t = 1.94,
p = 0.056, semipartial r = 0.21) became stronger, while the effect of nAffilia-
tion (B = −0.059, SE = 0.053, t = −1.10, p = 0.274, semipartial r = −0.12)
was no longer significant. Additionally, a marginally significant main effect
of AI (B = 0.097, SE = 0.050, t = 1.93, p = 0.057, semipartial r = 0.21)
emerged. When we additionally did not control for arousal ratings of neu-
tral faces the pattern of results stayed the same, however the main effect of AI
could no longer be found.
4When we did not control for arousal ratings of FEEs, the overall regression
analysis remained significant [F(5, 78) = 3.23; p < 0.011, R2adjusted = 0.12].
The main effects of nAffiliation (B = −0.027, SE = 0.045, t = −0.60, p =
0.550, semipartial r = −0.06) was no longer significant, while the effect
of nAchievement (B = −0.083, SE = 0.044, t = −1.88, p = 0.064, semi-
partial r = −0.19) emerged as a tendency. Main effects of nPower (B =
−0.064, SE = 0.042, t = −1.51, p = 0.135, semipartial r = −0.17) or AI
(B = −0.064, SE = 0.042, t = −1.53, p = 0.131, semipartial r = −0.17)
could not be found. Additionally not controlling for valence ratings of neutral
faces did not further change the pattern of results.
5The nPower × AI interaction effect on arousal ratings remained signifi-
cant when we did not control for valence ratings of FEEs [F(5,395) = 4.30,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.037]. Additionally not controlling for arousal ratings of
neutral faces did not further change the pattern of results.
Table 3 | Test statistics of the regression analyses predicting arousal
ratings in response to facial expressions of emotion.
Variable B SE t p
Constant 4.087 0.354 11.55 <0.001
Arousal (Neutral) 0.385 0.059 6.48 <0.001
Valence (Emotion) −0.704 0.113 −6.25 <0.001
nAchievement 0.090 0.044 2.03 0.045
nAffiliation −0.097 0.044 −2.20 0.031
nPower 0.069 0.042 1.64 0.105
AI 0.056 0.042 1.34 0.184
R2adjusted 0.64
F(6, 77) 25.54***
Arousal (Neutral), arousal rating in response to neutral faces; Valence (Emotion),
average valence rating in response to facial expressions of emotion; nAchieve-
ment, implicit achievement motive; nAffiliation, implicit affiliation motive;
nPower, implicit power motive; AI, activity inhibition.
***p < 0.001.
Table 4 | Test statistics of the regression analyses predicting valence
ratings in response to facial expressions of emotion.
Variable B SE t p
Constant 3.273 0.356 9.19 <0.001
Valence (Neutral) 0.188 0.096 1.97 0.053
Arousal (Emotion) −0.399 0.059 −6.78 <0.001
nAchievement −0.008 0.037 −0.21 0.832
nAffiliation −0.068 0.036 −1.88 0.064
nPower −0.001 0.035 −0.02 0.985
AI −0.024 0.034 −0.72 0.477
R2adjusted 0.44
F(6,77) 11.90***
Valence (Neutral), valence rating in response to neutral faces; Arousal (Emotion),
average arousal rating in response to facial expressions of emotion; nAchieve-
ment, implicit achievement motive; nAffiliation, implicit affiliation motive;
nPower, implicit power motive; AI, activity inhibition.
***p < 0.001.
high-AI participants, arousal ratings for negatively valenced FEEs
increased with nPower (B = 0.18, SE = 0.07, semipartial r =
0.39, p = 0.011), while they tended to decrease for happiness
(B = −0.16, SE = 0.09, semipartial r = −0.27, p = 0.089).
A fourth repeated-measures regression analysis predicting
valence ratings could not find a similar nPower × AI × emotion
interaction effect [F(5, 385) = 0.66, p = 0.653, η2 = 0.007]6. (One
outlier with a studentized residual of 3.43 had to be removed from
this analysis.)
6When we did not control for arousal ratings of FEEs a significant nPower ×
AI × Emotion interaction effect emerged [F(5,395) = 3.00, p = 0.011, η2 =
0.031]. However, when we excluded one participant who was marked as
outlier in the original analysis, this interaction effect disappered completely
[F(5, 390) = 0.77, p = 0.575, η2 = 0.008]. Additionally not controlling for
arousal ratings of neutral faces did not further change the pattern of results.
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplots of associations between implicit motives and affect ratings (averaged across emotions). ∗p < 0.05; #p < 0.10.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we explored effects of implicit motives and AI on
ratings of subjectively experienced affect in response to six FEEs.
Our results provide evidence for associations of all three implicit
motives with arousal ratings, and of nAffiliation with valence
ratings. People high in nAchievement or nPower experience the
presentation of other people’s FEEs as overall more arousing com-
pared to people low in either of these motives. However, these
motives do not influence how pleasant people experience the
presentation of these FEEs. People high in nAffiliation, in turn,
experience the presentation of other people’s FEEs as overall less
arousing and more unpleasant compared to people low in this
motive. Additionally, for the combination of high levels of AI and
nPower, the inhibited powermotive, a pattern of emotion-specific
modulation of arousal ratings in response to neutral faces and
FEEs emerged. In low-AI individuals, nPower was associated with
stronger feelings of arousal in response to the presentation of neu-
tral faces, but no additional increase of subjectively experienced
arousal in response to FEEs, relative to neutral faces. In contrast,
in high-AI individuals, nPower was not associated with arousal
ratings in response to neutral expressions, but with weaker sub-
jective arousal in response to the presentation of happy faces and
with stronger subjective arousal in response to the presentation of
all other FEEs.
Considering the association between nPower and arousal rat-
ings, results confirm the notion that implicit motives amplify
affective responses to motivational incentives (Atkinson, 1957)
and previous research underscores that FEEs are motive-specific
(dis-)incentives that energize behavior. The motive-dependent
accentuation of overall arousal ratings might therefore reflect a
greater sensitivity for and reactivity to FEEs that represent rel-
evant feedback signals with learned meaning for the pursuit of
one’s motive-dependent goals in social interactions (Schultheiss,
2008).
Moreover, the additional nPower × AI × emotion interac-
tion effect on arousal ratings differentiates the nPower main effect
and shows that individuals with an inhibited power motive are
able to better differentiate explicitly between FEEs and experience
different arousal intensities in response to FEEs with differing sig-
nal value. This is remarkable, as typically the inhibited power
motive is associated with socially effective behavior and success,
whereas uninhibited power motivation tends to be associated
with a more impulsive, exploitative and hostile interaction style
(Schultheiss, 2008). We speculate that differential responses by
individuals with and without inhibited power motive to interac-
tion partners’ FEEs may be partly responsible for these divergent
behavioral outcomes. Individuals with an inhibited power motive
may perceive happy FEEs as an indication of their own positive
emotional impact on another person, which is reinforcing for
them, while they correctly perceive negative FEEs as indications of
a lack in their goal progress or as a threat to their own dominance.
In the long run, more differentiated responses of individuals
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FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots of associations between nPower and arousal ratings for different emotions, depending on participants’ AI level; Solid circles
and lines: people high in AI; crosses and dashed lines: people low in AI. ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; #p < 0.10.
with an inhibited power motive to specific FEEs in others might
foster positive and successful social interactions. In contrast, indi-
viduals with an uninhibited power motive simply seem to be
aroused by faces in general and not by specific FEEs. This lack
of response differentiation could hamper adequate social inter-
actions. This result might be important in a broader theoretical
context of social interactions, e.g., for different behavioral modes
of obtaining higher status in social hierarchies (e.g., Henrich and
Gil-White, 2001; Cheng et al., 2010, 2013), but we avoid far reach-
ing interpretations, as the nPower x AI interaction effects needs to
be replicated first.
As a limitation of our study, missing effects of nPower or the
inhibited power motive on valence ratings might be attributed to
the lower variance in these ratings or the notion that valence rat-
ings of FEEs is highly over-learned or over-determined by culture
(Russell, 1994) and therefore not sensitive to motive-dependent
modulation. Moreover, nAchievement predicted arousal ratings
positively and nAffiliation predicted both affect dimensions neg-
atively. These findings show that the affect amplifier property
of implicit motives generalizes beyond the domain of power to
all motives under investigation. However, we avoid interpreting
these preliminary findings, as a replication of the main effects
of nAchievement and nAffiliation seems mandatory before doing
so. However, it is worth noting that the effects for nAffilia-
tion could only be demonstrated when we explored the spe-
cific variance in arousal and valence ratings, which cannot be
attributed to the presentation of faces per se (ensured by con-
trolling for the corresponding ratings for neutral faces) or to the
large amount of shared variance between the two affect mea-
sures (ensured by controlling for the second affect dimension in
each analysis). Replication studies should take this approach into
account.
Another limitation of our study comes from the affect rat-
ing task itself. Participants were presented with a high number
of different FEEs in quick succession. This raises the question
if the affect ratings in our study can be compared to naturally
elicited affect. In our opinion, affective reactions from our par-
ticipants do only differ from natural affect in terms of intensity,
as changes in affect are rapidly occurring reactions under natu-
ral circumstances as well (see Oatley et al., 2006). Additionally,
recent fMRI studies of affective responses to emotion-eliciting
events demonstrate that brain activations, subjective feelings, as
well as accompanied visceral changes occur rapidly upon elicita-
tion (Wager et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the
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results reported here have to be replicated under more naturalistic
conditions.
Taken together, our findings are consistent with recent work
on implicit motives and FEEs (see Stanton et al., 2010). They con-
firm that incentive effects of perceived FEEs, previously assessed
with procedural measures, extend to declarative measures of sub-
jectively experienced affect in reaction to FEEs. If individuals aim
to react appropriately to different FEEs, depending on their rel-
evance for a given implicit motive, FEEs need to be appraised
accordingly (Frijda, 2007). As implicit motives operate outside
of conscious awareness, this points to the notion that appraisal
of FEEs may proceed partly at an unconscious level (cf. Moors,
2010). Additionally, our results are important as they indicate that
implicit motives unfold their influence not only at the level of
unconscious and procedural processes, which are inaccessible for
introspection, but also to some degree at the level of conscious
affective processes. In the context of established two-process
models of motivation (e.g., McClelland et al., 1989; Schultheiss,
2001), our results point to affect as a potential means of between-
systems information exchange, making the output of the implicit
system available to the explicit system. Focusing on or becom-
ing aware of one’s affective reaction in specific situations (e.g.,
observing other people’s FEEs) could make the implicit-explicit
barrier more permeable, as subjectively experienced affect can be
understood as a valid indicator of progress toward one’s implicit
needs.
CONCLUSION
This research has shown that affective responses to FEEs are
influenced by the interplay between FEEs and perceivers’ implicit
motives and AI. Future studies should establish causality for these
associations, extend our understanding of these associations by
incorporating indirect measures of affect (e.g., skin conductance
and heart rate), and compare these with results from declarative
measures of affect.
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